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2SUMMARY
This paper argues that opportunities for reducing poverty, improving social inclusion,
and influencing policy and institutional changes are being missed as a result of not
learning sufficiently from development practitioners who have been effective in
bringing about positive changes in the past. Cautionary tales, positive deviance,
innovations systems and aid ethnographic literature is reviewed. Three agricultural
and natural resources case studies of positive experiences are described. These cover
the spread of bamboo tubewells in eastern Bihar, changes in rice research policy and
the rice innovation system in Nepal, and the spread of groups and group based
organisations and federations in Nepal. These are used to illustrate how institutional
innovations at macro levels came about and gave rise to positive development
outcomes. Implications for innovations theory and for rural development practice are
discussed.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing interest in how agricultural and natural
resources projects and programmes can be made more effective in reducing rural
poverty, increasing social inclusion and influencing policy and institutional change.
This interest it expressed through manuals and workshops on learning and change,
new action research projects and policy studies to investigate, develop and test new
approaches and procedures. Much of this thinking is couched within the dominant
framework that development is a rational problem solving exercise. While there are
many studies which have critiqued this view1, it is still the dominant framework used
in development policy and research discourses. This paper is not a further critique of
dominant frameworks, but rather a suggestion that there is another approach, that can
compliment the mainstream, problem solving, linear approaches. The idea is simple.
Learn from the positive. It involves purposely seeking out and learning from past and
contemporary political/cultural situations where positive things are occurring, and
learning from the way different actors are already being effective in bringing about
positive changes.  The entry point for this analysis is finding situation where, on the
surface positive changes are taking place. This is a very different entry point from
much conventional poverty and social inclusion analysis where the preoccupation is
with describing how bad the situation is, and what are the barriers and constraints to
change. It is also different from focussing on assessing the outcomes of early planned
interventions. In this later case there is often preoccupation with reporting on planned
indicators, describing average outcomes, and then listing problems and constraints as
to why outcomes were not as good as forecasted. Only too often there appears yet
another list of problems of bad planning, corruption, and how different types of
parochial interests dominating over development goals. This is followed by a list of
recommendations, many of which have little chance of being implemented as
suggested. Learning from the positive, does not discard learning from the outcomes of
past planned interventions; however, it opens up the possibility of looking for
different things. This is learning from actors who have already been effect in existing
political, economic and cultural environments in bringing about significant positive
changes.
.
PLANNED REFLECTION, LEARNING AND CHANGE IS DIFFICULT
                                                 
1 For some of the earlier critiques see Griffin, and Clay and Schaffer.
3Learning and change is generally hard and problematical. The starting point for much
analysis is an assumption that rural development actors want to increase the relevance
and effectiveness of development interventions. However, development activities take
place in political and cultural contexts where this may not be a good assumption.
Besides the agendas of political actors, there are the parochial interests on the part of
different actors. These parochial interests might be the interests of specific Ministries,
specific research programmes, specific donors, NGOs etc., not to mention the
egotistical and career ambitions of specific people in these organisations and groups.
Analysis of these issues is not new as well illustrated by Thomas in a chapter of a
book of cautionary tales in the mid 1970s. He was trying to explain why in
Bangladesh irrigation policy and practice resulted in the promotion of the most costly
forms of irrigation, from a national development perspective, rather than in the
promotion of more relevant and cheaper alternatives. He found there was a
commonality of interests between the dominant irrigation ministry, the donors, the
exporters of machinery, and the consultants involved. The authors of the book of
cautionary tales expected (hoped) that the book would be read and there would be
learning on the part of development practitioners.
Similar themes concerning the motivation and interests of development actors are now
being taken up in the growing ethnographic literature on development practice2. In the
rural development literature, we have Rhoades’ recent study that examines the
outcomes of efforts over many years to promote the substantial inclusion of economic
and other social science analysis in natural resources R&D programmes. Gurung and
Menter examine the outcomes of the promotion of concerns for gender analysis in an
international research centre. At the policy and M&E level, Horton, Mackay,
Anderson, and Dupleich look at the impact of a large programme to improve the
planning capacity in these areas. They found little impact at the policy level, while
individuals had benefited from the training. These studies found that often the
language and rhetoric of the advocacy was taken on board, but there was little
meaningful change underneath. Some of these finding are not new, but reinforce the
findings of earlier studies, such as the ISNAR impact assessment in the mid 1980s of
about 30 multidisciplinary poverty oriented on farm farming systems programmes in 9
countries (Merrill Sands, et al.). A recent review and assessment of some major DFID
funded natural resources research project shows problems of a lack of effective
poverty reduction outcomes, lack of significant interdisciplinary and institutional
collaboration, etc (Lenne and Thomas). In the light of these types of findings, one
cannot help but ask why there is so little learning.
Refreshingly, what is new about some of the current ethnographic research is that they
are looking inside the black box of research and development agencies and
investigating the reasons for the “non adoption” by development and research
practitioners of lessons from the past and of approaches and methods aimed at making
their work more relevant to development goals. This type of research is not only
confined to local actors in developing countries, but also focuses on behaviour of
major donor agencies such as the World Bank. It is paradoxical after all, that after
years of advocating and promoting project cycle management tools;  with their
emphasis on learning and change through M&E methods, a recent new manual on
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4good M&E practice for agricultural projects noted that in 2002 there was very little
M&E in any World Bank funded projects3.
One of the responses to the mixed outcomes of past efforts has been the development
of new action research projects and policy research designed to make development
efforts more effective. Hopefully these will come up with some useful innovations
that will be effective. However, there is at least one complimentary way of
proceeding, learning for the positive, and that is what we will be discussing here.
LEARNING FROM THE POSITIVE
Learning from the positive is not new. However, recently Sternin has made the
approach very succinctly be using the term positive deviance. If you think of a
statistical distribution, there are observations either side of an average. Why not
investigate and learn from the situations that give rise to the observations that lie on
the positive side of the curve. In the governance literature Judith Tender’s research
has rural development case studies of how and why in a part of Brazil many positive
things were happening, whereas in the surrounding districts there was widespread
corruption and nepotism. Significantly she concluded that if development actors at the
time had used the current “best practice” manuals to guide their interventions, then in
all probability these positive outcomes would not have come about. In Bangladesh in
the early 1970s, after independence from West Pakistan there was a great deal of
innovative rural development activity taking place. The Ministry of Rural
Development coordinated a wide range of study teams to quickly investigate what
was happening and what could be learnt for those development initiatives4.
Douthwaite’s recent book on understanding processes of rural mechanisation
includes, not only stories of very misguided development actions, but also detailed
case studies of where technical innovations spread, and detailed analysis of the actual
role of different actors over time. In the late 1990 Krishna, Uphoff and Esman asked
key actors who had been involved in major “successes” to write up their personal
reflections. They then drew out overall lessons from the case studies. The pioneers of
the national innovation system approach to national science and technology policy is a
case of where the intention of the study was to understand the relationships between
science and society that had given rise to rapid economic growth in Japan (Nelson,
Freeman)5. In the field of rural development Jain examined the management and the
institutional contextual dimensions of a range of major programmes in Asia which, by
many criteria could be seen as contributing significantly to rural development goals
(Jain, 1994, 1996). In Nepal Messerschmidt (1988) analysed why a UNICEF/Small
farmer development agency project to revitalise the handmade paper industry has
been so successful.  So there is a large literature that looks at positive experiences.
What constitutes “success” is frequently contested. This is well illustrated by
assessments of the outcomes of the forestry policies in Nepal to promote community
forestry user groups for environmental and community development goals. By some
                                                 
3 This observation was given in Alex and Byerlee. A review of the lack of learning on the part of
writers of new management manuals is given by Biggs and Smith.
4 The Ministry published quickly the reports coming from the studies. Some were called rushed reports,
others quick reports. An example is the study by Yunus and Latifee on why a local cooperative was
working well, while so many at the time were taken over by elites, and or were corrupt.
5 The national innovations framework has been used recently in natural resources analysis by Hall,
Biggs and Matsaert and several case studies are included in Hall, et al.
5observers it is described as a great success, and a model that should be promoted all
over the world. For others, while it is seen as environmentally successful as forest
coverage has increased, the impacts on poverty reduction and social inclusion are very
mixed.6. Another problem arises when donors and other assessors change their criteria
of success, as illustrated by Mosse (2003).
In addition to earlier studies that learnt from past positive situations there are some
new development intervention methods that provide guidelines for building on the
positive; for example Appreciative Inquiry (Hammond and Royal, and Whitney and
Trosten Bloom).
 There are three main places where we might look to observe and understand how
actors have been effective in bringing about positive change. First, where planned
intervention (policy, programme, project or activity) contributed in some way to a
positive outcome. Second, where planned interventions contributed to positive
outcomes, but these things occurred unexpectedly or because the positive outcomes
came about in spite of the plans. Third, positive things happened, but this was not as a
result of coordinated planned interventions. Of course one could go in circles here by
arguing that all outcomes are due to the “policy” environment. However, I hope we
can avoid that detour. In this paper we are concerned with learning from actors in all
three situations; especially the last two situations.7
CASE STUDIES
To illustrate the argument being made in this paper I have chosen three case studies.
They have been chosen with the following criteria in mind8. First, they are from
different times. One describes an innovation process that was taking place over 30
years ago, and the others look at more recent periods. The older case study is included
to show that some processes of change have relevance to contemporary political
economy contexts. Second, to show that selecting criteria for assessing “success” and
“positive” changes is always difficult and problematic, as well as being time specific.
Third, I was present in the locations where these changes were taking place, but not a
significant actor in what was happening. This means I am aware of some of the
broader political, economic and cultural contextual issues in which these case studies
are embedded.  I have also had a chance to reflect and look back at what was
happening in a broader and more detached way. Four, The case studies are sufficiently
documented to make them empirically based and credible. Fifth, prima facie evidence
suggests that these were changing social situations where positive outcomes were
                                                 
6 See Biggs, Gurung and Messerschmidt for a review. Rent seeking, parochial interests, and other
reasons for why donors, government agencies, and others who influence forestry policy and
development practice did not given more attention to being effective in promoting poverty reduction
and social inclusion agendas are investigated in Biggs and Messerschmidt, 2003)
7  This is not to say that negative outcomes are not interesting, and that we cannot learn from them.
Paradoxically, their seems to be more interest in understanding ways in which corruption, rent seeking,
nepotism, etc takes place, and why planned interventions “fail” than analysing how effective people
have been able to bring about positive change in the real world of political and parochial interests in
which they work.
8 Hopefully readers of this paper will be able to provide other case studies and document their own
experiences; thereby we can build up a firmer and more substantial empirical data base. The gender and
social exclusion assessment of groups and group based organisations in Nepal has at least 12 case
studies where many of today’s development gaols, as illustrated by the Millennium Development Goals
are being improved (Biggs, Gurung and Messerschmidt). In Nepal there many more positive cases that
can be documented.
6occurring. Six. They illustrate processes of institutional innovation at the macro policy
and institutional level that relate directly to issues of “scaling up” of technology,
micro institutions and new research and development methods and techniques.
Spread of Bamboo Tubewells in Bihar.
The first case is taken from Eastern Bihar, one of the poorest and most socially
differentiated parts of rural India. Very large family holdings existed side by side with
smaller holdings and sharecroppers. Over 50% of the rural households were landless
labouring households, many of whom were obligated to larger landowners in debt and
in other ways. The main irrigation emphasis in the region was the canal system for the
Kosi barrage. In the late 1960s the government sponsored a minor irrigation
programme promoting a package of technology of a shallow tube well and a pump set.
To be eligible for government credit farmers had to sign up to the fixed package.
What actually happened as regards the spread of acres irrigated was a story very
different from what the planners had had in mind9. Essentially rural innovators, some
research minded farmers, artisans, traders, landless labourers started to “depackage”
the package and created new technology and institutions. One of the most interesting
innovations was the bamboo tubewell. Artisans made very low cost bamboo tubewells
and sunk several of them for farmers who had scattered plots. Pumpsets were
mounted on bullock carts to serve several bamboo tubewells. Markets in pumping
services and water quickly developed. It was not long before the bamboo tubewells
were irrigating more land than the government canal irrigation system (Biggs, 1981).
As regards making irrigation water available to farmers where and when they wanted
it, the spread of the bamboo tubewell was a success. It provided rural livelihoods for
the poor by increasing employment for landless households; especially in the winter
season when there was little employment as few crops had been grown previously.
Because of the service markets and smaller scale of the technology it was more
accessible to smaller farms and sharecroppers. One of the reasons for including this
case study is because it is an example, not only of informal R&D by people in rural
communities, but also of the institutional innovative behaviour of the local District
Kosi Commissioner. When he saw these new technical and institutional innovations
spreading in the field he organised a special programme for their promotion. This was
no easy task because at the time development thinking in India was dominated by the
top down promotion of “one size fits all” single packages. Bureaucracies were created
and instructed to manage such programmes. Not only did the district commissioner
effectively promote this bamboo technology and the water markets in his region, but
he also had a much wider impact on informing irrigation policy and practice in the
country as a whole. This was by getting an article published in the most widely read
and influential policy and development information sheet; the Economic and Political
Weekly (Appu, 1974). The fact that the paper was written by an innovative bureaucrat
made it all the more influential because it was written in a style and in the language
that was in use amongst planners and development practitioners at the time. The
“scaling up” of the bamboo tubewell, took place mainly in the private sector, however
the rate of their spread was increased as a result of the behaviour of a social
entrepreneur in the public sector who created institutional innovations which were
                                                 
9 This was well documented in a thesis by Clay in the early 1970s and written up for more general
readership in a widely read CERES publication (Clay, 1980). Other documentation includes Domman,
Appu, Biggs 1981. It would be interesting to see what has now happened in ground water irrigation and
who has benefited over the last 30 years.
7relevant and effective in the local political, technical, cultural and economic
environment.
In the mid 1970s the spread of bamboo tubewells for irrigation and drinking water
purposes was seen as a positive occurrence according to many of today’s development
criteria. However, it was not known at the time that the water may have poisoned with
arsenic. The widespread arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh and West Bengal from
shallow tubewells might also exist in Eastern Bihar, which sadly throws a different
light on what was seen as positive situation in the 1970s.
Policy Changes and Institutional Innovation in the Nepal Rice Improvement
System
A second case study is taken from Nepal. This is a case where, almost unwittingly a
project had major positive effects on bringing about significant changes in rice
research and the institutional structures of the agricultural research and extension
system.
In late 1997 a client oriented participatory plant breeding project was started in Nepal.
It was designed to adapt and develop cost effective methods for improving rice
varieties available to farmers in high potential agro climatic conditions. The project
was premised on the grounds that on the Nepal terai (plains) most of the grain grown
by farmers was sold and that the region was relatively uniform as regards physical and
socioeconomic conditions.  An eye opener for the project staff in the first year was a
farmer livelihood analysis which showed not only a great deal of variation in agro
climatic conditions, but also great diversity in social economic characteristics: many
household were food deficit and many poor cultivators came socially excluded
groups. This survey was originally seen as a benchmark and data collection study to
assess the project’s impact at the end of the project. However, in reality it turned out
to be a poverty monitoring survey. In this case it monitored the project’s assumptions
and claims to development relevance. At about the same time the main outside
funding agency, DFID was placing greater emphasis on poverty reduction and
livelihoods improvements. The project staff changed the project (and log frame)
significantly at that point. The project continued to monitor annually poverty
conditions and impacts at the village level. The poverty reduction impacts have been
well documented and the estimates of economic rates of return to the project have
been high10. However, the project had a far wider range of positive policy and
institutional impacts that had not been envisaged in the original project design. These
were:  1) The formal recognition of the informal R&D systems on the terai, and the
creation of mechanisms for using information from these informal R&D systems in
formal R&D systems. For example, a long standing problem for the formal
government rice improvement programme is how to acknowledge varieties that
continuously came over the very long open border with India through farmer to
farmer, trader and other exchanges, and to take on board varieties that come out of
farmer breeding activities. 2) Changes in the National Varietal Release Procedures.
These changes allowed data from non government research institutions and farmers to
be used in making national release and varietal promotion decisions. The membership
of release committee was extended to include research NGOs, farmers and project
staff. Something that had only taken place, if at all, in a token way in the past. 3)
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8Creation of methods for effective Government, NGO and farmer collaboration, at the
village and more importantly at higher institutional levels. After local district
agricultural officers, NGO staff and farmers had been working together “informally”
in the early years, they drew up more formal Letters of Agreements (LOA). These
new institutions gave rise to the legitimisation of such LOA throughout the
agricultural research and extension system. This was no mean task in an environment
of much hostility between these types of actors. 4) Creating methods and institutional
arrangements for extending the participatory plant breeding and seed production
approach to all the major rice growing districts and several hill districts. The way the
“scaling up” took place, was opportunistic, in the sense that the project had no plan
for “scaling up”, but the local project staff contacted another parallel government
programme and jointly developed new ways of doing things. Again no mean task in
an institutional environment where still different aid agencies, government
departments, NGOs pursue their own hierarchical management structures, with often
only tip service to creating effective “lateral” linkages.
From a policy and long term institutional reform perspective these are very important
outcomes11. However, they were not seen as goals of the original project.
Furthermore, almost all of the policy and institutional changes came about as a result
of the social entrepreneurship and innovative behaviour of the local project staff. With
national policy and institutional change in their minds, they took opportunities as they
came along. To a large degree, only they knew enough about the power relationships
in the policy and development arenas, to see and know opportunities when they arose.
Almost without exception, effective actions in the policy and institutional arenas were
never planned (i.e. they were not in the annual work plan based on the log frame).
However, once show to be effective, the log frame and annual plans were changed
accordingly each year. In the project there was a culture of continuous institutional
innovation. In Nepal social exclusion at the village level is a critical issue for
understanding causes of poverty. In this regard project staff increasingly worded with
poorer and marginalised groups and with a local NGO which concentrated on social
empowerment issues. Paradoxically, while the project has contributed significantly to
policy, institutional and social inclusion goals, it has not documented or analysed how
it played a significant role in these processes12*.  However, while this might be seen
as a single country case study, there are generalisations that could help inform similar
policy and institutional reform discourses in other countries; especially in Asia. A
further paradox is that in donor and government discourses in Nepal on poverty
reduction strategies, policy change and institutional reform one does not often hear
mention these positive changes that are already taking place on the ground. This is an
interesting observation, given that rice is the most important crop in the country, and
profoundly influences not only agricultural productivity, but also the livelihoods and
welfare of a very large number of poor people.
Groups and Group based Organisations and Federations in Nepal
The third study concerns an overall review of groups and group based organisations in
Nepal. This exploratory study was undertaken as part of a larger Gender and Social
                                                 
11 The project also developed and adapted participatory plant breeding methods, with international
collaboration with rice improvements researchers in other countries. These aspects of the project are
widely written up in journal articles by project staff. For example see Joshi, Sthapit and Witcombe.
12 This being done now. See Joshi, et al., 2005
9Exclusion Assessment for the National Planning Commission, DFID and the World
Bank13.  Different types of groups have existed in Nepal for many years. The way
these have been organised and managed has always reflected the local political,
cultural, economic and technical environment. The promotion of groups has been the
major implementation instrument of all government, donor, NGO and other
development agencies. There are forest user groups, micro credit groups, irrigation
user groups, health user groups, road and bridge building groups, and many, many
more types of sponsored groups. We attempted to get an overall estimate of the
current number of groups promoted by development actors and reckoned it must be at
least 500,00014. In Nepal development groups can put into three main categories. 1)
Common property management (CPM) groups. These would be forest user groups,
surface and tubewell irrigation groups. 2) Service delivery groups. These would be the
micro credit groups, health groups etc. 3. Social mobilisation groups. These are
groups that form around specific social issues. For example land rights, abolition of
bonded labour, squatter rights. These groups often work with actors who use an array
of non formal education methods. While there is considerable overlap between these
categories, the agencies who promote them normally concentrate on the main function
first. For example NGOs that promote different forms of non formal education often
are associated with social movements groups. Agencies concerned with rural finance
issues work with savings and credit groups as well as groups formed to gain access to
outside credit. In the study we were particularly interested in groups and group based
organisations that had given rise to positive outcomes, as regards poverty reduction,
gender, social inclusion and effective influence in policy and development arenas.
From the perspective of this paper, one of the most interesting findings of the study
was the great array of outcomes that had occurred after groups had been sponsored at
the village level. Different types of federations, cooperatives, informal groupings, etc
have emerged. There is tremendous diversity in the structures of the higher level
institutional models found in Nepal. There was no “natural evolution” of federations,
or any pre planned process15. These ever changing models have come into existence
in wide number of ways. Sometimes the federation process was planned by an agency,
as was the case with some micro credit institutions, however, on other occasions, such
as with the informal federations of mainly women’s farmer field school groups the
process was the outcome of local people, taking collective action to purchase inputs
together, or to demand improved services from government extension officers. In
some cases this has led to them registering themselves as a cooperative. In some cases
the federation was formed first and groups came second. This was the situation of the
                                                 
13 For details of the larger study see Bennett. This section is based on Biggs, Gurung and
Messerschmidt, 2004.
14 There are numerous problems in estimating the number of groups, due to the reality that groups come
and go, overlap, etc. To get an estimate of the number of members in groups is even more challenging
as people often belong to multiple groups, and what constitutes “membership” also presents challenges.
15 At least one of the major donor projects, the Production Credit for Rural Women did have planned
overall hierarchical institutional structure. However, in this project, some of the really interesting
institutional innovations came out of the activities of women at the village level, who got into a whole
range of activities such as legal fights to address ongoing abuses of women. These significant and
important outcomes were not planned as part of the project, and are still not adequately monitored
understood and promoted. A recent study has looked into some of these institutional innovations (KC,
2003) however, from the perspective of this paper on monitoring and supporting positive institutional
innovation, this PCRW project had not developed internal innovations, so it could promote some of the
positive things it was helping to bring about.
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Society for Preservation of Shelters and Habitation in Nepal (SPOSH-Nepal). At first
SPOSH campaigned for squatter’s rights, but then SPOSH stated working with
settlement groups called unit committees. After that district committees were formed.
In addition we found there was no general rule that government or NGOs or the
private sector were the leaders of federation processes. As in most countries there is
cooperatives legislation. However, while in Europe cooperatives are associated with
socialist values, in Nepal they were not traditionally seen as vehicles of promoting the
interests of poorer people or excluded groups. However, even here, we found that
some women’s fisher groups (often an excluded ethnic group) were using the
cooperative legislation to their own advantage. These were situations where local
innovators were using and modifying existing institutional arrangements to meet their
interests. To some extent different, and sometimes ambiguous legislation existed
concerning the registering of groups. However, for effective innovators this was part
of the reality of the institutional landscape, which had to be navigated in one way or
another. Sometimes this meant being effective in getting the legislation change.
Nepal is internationally well-known for its forestry policy which legitimised
traditional forest user groups, after the period when the state had nationalised forests.
Over time a national federation has developed. This is the national Federation of
Community Forest Users, Nepal (FECOFUN) with its membership of over 14,000
groups. It has developed in its own way and has often effectively challenged
government decisions. The government has given more support to another civil
society organisation; Nepal Federation of Forest Resource User Groups (NEFUG).
Recently FECOFUN has entered into the political arena in other ways by joining
protests for the return of democracy after the King dissolved parliament and declared
a state of emergency in February 2004.
The overwhelming evidence from the 12 positive case studies we examined was that
effective institutional innovations came from actors in the local context. When and if
outside institutional models (or parts of them) were useful, it was because they were
assessed by “insiders” as being relevant in that context for bringing about change in
the power structure in the local political/cultural setting. There were no “natural
processes” or “hidden hands” that gave rise to a “natural evolutionary” process. There
were continuous political/cultural battles taking place, with effective people and
coalitions bringing about these changes.
Analysis and Discussion
Are there general lessons that can be learnt from these case studies, or are they just
anecdotal stories? I think there are some generalities that can be drawn out and they
are group here under lessons for innovation theory and lessons for rural development
practice.
Innovation Theory and practice
Location Specificity
The innovations we have looked at here are all location specific. They can only be
understood with reference to the time, place, culture and political context in which
they took place. The creation and subsequent spread of the letter of agreement (LOA)
in the rice innovation system in Nepal, is in some senses not a new idea. Letters of
agreement, memorandum of understanding, etc are the very stock in trade of
development activities. However, here the specific nature of the LOA, the way it
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evolved, who created and developed it in the local government district offices of
Nepal, meant that it was a local innovation. At the time respect and collaboration
between government officials. R&D NGOs, poorer farmers was not widespread. This
institutional innovation provided a relevant and viable way forward. The fact that this
type of LOA has now spread within the government structures to over 25 of the 75
districts in Nepal is evidence of it usefulness. Whether they become routinised,
formulaic and merely provide a means of furthering parochial interests will remain to
be seen. The types of group federation processes taking place in Nepal are also time
and contextually specific. There has been no formula for the formulation of effective
federations; each has developed in very different ways. The radical program for the
promotion of bamboo tube well groundwater irrigation in Bihar flew in the face of all
conventional irrigation planning at the time. These case studies therefore seriously
question any innovation theories that suggest there is linear process of research,
development, testing, scaling up, and adoption of technology or new institutions.
Consequently, any analysis of technology and institutional change without a full
description of the role of different political, economic and institutional actors in which
the change is taking place is not very useful for those who might want to draw out
generalities or learn other lessons. This is especially so for institutional innovations
that on the face of it appear to reduce poverty and increase social inclusion.
Multiple sources of Innovation
These case studies provide evidence that important technical and institutional
innovations arise from multiple sources16. Important innovations do not necessarily
come from planned and directed research, and then get passed onto “development”
agencies for promotion and “scaling up”. Varieties of rice used by farmers on the terai
came from research stations, from farmer informal R&D systems, from joint
farmer/researcher activities, and from multiple other sources. The pumps used in the
spread of the bamboo tubewells came from “outside” sources, however, the bamboo
well itself and the range of institutional innovations for the exchange of services, and
the “scaling up” of the wells came from within the local social and cultural
environment. The new ongoing institutional innovations described here, have been
just as important as any of the technical innovations, such as new rice varieties, new
research approaches, etc that came from planned activities. It could be argued that the
local institutional innovations were more important than the planned technical
innovations. This is because in the cases we have described, it was the institutional
innovations that were the critical effective innovations that gave to widespread
poverty reduction and increased social inclusion.
Temporary Contending Coalitions of Actors
In all cases, there were formal and informal coalitions of actors who worked together
to confront and challenge existing orthodoxies of habitual and formulaic behaviour.
The terms of reference for the Kosi development officer in Bihar in the early 1970s
was to support, coordinate and help implement the policies and programmes of line
ministries. One of these was the programme for minor irrigation and the promotion of
the shallow tubewells package. In this case the Kosi commissioner did quite the
opposite, and in formal and informal ways joined up with a whole range of new
partners from different organisations as well as farmers, artisans and others from the
                                                 
16 For an account of formal and informal R&D systems, and of the multiple sources of innovation
model see Biggs and Clay and Biggs.
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private sectors17. The transparent way he went about this, reflected in part by the
article in the national journal, the Economic and Political weekly, was also part of the
strategy to question and effectively challenge the power structures of existing
orthodoxies. In Nepal, the way the rice breeding NGO formed formal and informal
alliances with some senior government personnel in the rice plant breeding
establishment resulted in long term and significant changes in Nepal’s agricultural
research policies and development practices. The growth of the powerful forest user
group federation came about as part of a coalition of actors. In this strategy, an outside
agency, the Ford Foundation provided some funding. However, not even the
opponents of the powerful FECOFUN would say this was a Ford Foundation created
institution. Ford Foundation was a member of the coalition, but certainly the staff of
the Foundation were not “the drivers of change”. The drivers were local social
entrepreneurs who thought strategically and saw the Foundation as a possible outside
source of useful support.
Transparency on the Local Ground
A theme which appears to coming out of these case studies is that there was
transparency on the ground in all the local contexts. In the case of the rice breeding
programme in Nepal, the log frame provided a transparent document which all the
actors had access to. This, and the annual work plans were repeatedly (and often
radically) changed as learning and reflection took place. In villages there were no
ambiguities about what the project and its staff were doing. In various routine
governments sponsored workshops, such as the government annual summer crops
workshop attended by senior members of the agricultural research establishment,
there were sometime heated public disagreements.  In the case of the bamboo
tubewells, anyone visiting the Kosi region would not only see the irrigation
technology spreading on the ground, but also by asking the right questions hear about
the spread of new institutional arrangements. They would also be able to gather
quickly enough information to make a reasonable judgement on whether their spread
was reducing poverty reducing and improving socially inclusion. Again all of the
significant changes taking place were transparent. This was because the bureaucrats
involved were finding room to manoeuvre within the normal structures of government
procedures. They were also finding ways to be innovative and change structures. The
EPW article and other publications about the Bihar irrigation innovations made them
transparent in national and international arenas. I suspect at the time, although the
information was available, the international community of academics, irrigation
companies and consultants were not interested in these types of innovation. However,
this was not due to secrecy, a lack of transparency, or a lack of information. It was
due to the nature of the specific political economy of that arena of research and
development, and the parochial interests of the actors involved.
 Central Role of Personal Behaviour
In all cases we find the names of specific individuals keep on coming up. None of the
processes we describe were in any sense situations where “evolution” or “market
forces” were “naturally” propelling social change. In the case studies above, I have
tried to avoid using the names of individuals. The reasons for this were to avoid “hero
                                                 
17 In today’s jargon, it is possible this might be called participatory, stakeholder appreciative inquiry
development. This was happening in the early 1970s for anyone to see, learn from and use in their
development work.
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worship” or ideas of training of “leaders”. Yes, we found local heroes18, but in none
of the cases we review had they been on a “leadership” course. They saw themselves
as social entrepreneurs helping to facilitate processes of positive social and technical
change. Most of the local heroes had a long background (both personally and in their
professional work) in trying to be effective in promoting poverty reduction and social
justice issues. In their approach there was never a case of saying it was “someone
else’s job” to think through the consequences of the technical and social innovations
they were involved in creating and promoting. If other work needed to be done they
were effective in getting suitable actors into the coalition. One of the reasons why I
used the term temporary coalitions is because coalitions are generally temporary, as
circumstances are always changing. This is highlighted in Nepal at the moment, as
evidence is rapidly appearing that some manual and mechanical shallow tubewells are
producing water contaminated with arsenic. For a range of parochial reasons, some
actors in drinking water and irrigation programmes are unaware of the information, or
are acting very slowly. Hence, the membership of socially responsible water
development coalitions is changing quite quickly.
Positive and Negative Institutional Innovations
In this paper I have concentrated on understanding processes of positive social
change. This fully acknowledges that a value judgement is being used to assess
institutional innovations. In research there is always a choice of what to work on. It
seems a great deal of effort goes into studies, assessments, evaluations of a formulaic
type, or of negative institutional innovations, such types of corruption, rent seeking,
nepotism,  parochial interests, etc. A choice was made here to explore ways to learn
from social entrepreneurs who work in those same environments and who have found
ways to be innovative and effective in socially responsible ways. We can learn from
those people.
Are Institutional Innovation Processes Different From Technical
Innovation Processes?
The answer is probably yes. What the case studies show is that major and significant
institutional innovations came up all the time from within the local context19.
Informal, unplanned R&D was always taking place in different arenas. Local actors
and coalitions were finding new ways to adapt and change old and new technologies
and institutions. Existing power structures were being effectively challenged and
changed. Even when new methods, technologies were developed or introduced from
outside, these were generally modified and changed, by local actors so as to make
them useful in the local context. It appears that to be effective social entrepreneurs
had to be institutionally innovative all the time. Otherwise actors in the same
environment with parochial interests found ways to take over structures for their
benefits. This is why “scaling up” was not a job to be done at the end of a R&D
pipeline.  At a superficial level it might appear that micro level institutional structures,
such as methods for participatory research, or for forming and managing micro credit
                                                 
18 For a description of local heroes effectively promoting gender issues in micro credit situations see
Goetz, and in a wide range of groups and group based situations in Nepal see Biggs, Gurung and
Messerschmidt, 2004.
19 By local, it is meant local in the social sense. Therefore local can mean the environments where
policy discourses and actions take place. For example policy decisions are frequently not made in the
formal institutions designated as the “policy making bodies”, such as parliaments and planning
commissions.
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groups, forest user groups, and cooperatives, can be “scaled up” by policy directives
to form higher level institutional structures. What our case studies of positive
institutional innovation showed was that these processes were as complex and
challenging, as any of the processes that led to the new micro level innovations. While
at the micro level, there might be similarities and minor adaptation of say Grameen
Bank type credit users groups between countries, the way the Grameen Bank in
different countries operates at the macro level, and effectively influence national
financial policy and development practice depends on the specific institutional
structures of the national situation. In the case of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh,
Von Pischke describes how staff of the Bank strategically selected Board members
who represent all the major financial institutions in the country, so as to maintain
transparency about its operations, and reduce the changes that “false stories” would be
spread by other interest groups. In our case of rice research and promotion policy in
Nepal, the local actors found ways to change procedures and institutions throughout
the whole rice innovation system. The general lesson is that in each country, local
social entrepreneurs will have to be equally as inventive to create effective
institutional innovations that are relevant to the local political and other time specific
contextual conditions. Certainly, the idea that one size can fit all, or that widely
adaptable higher level institutions can be transfer between countries is an appealing
but a very bad starting point. It might on occasions, have relevance for some
technology innovations, but not for higher level policy and institutional innovations.
Rural Development Practice
There are a number of practical development implications that follow from the
case studies and discussion so far.
Attitudes towards Development Interventions
The main thrust of this paper, is that there are generally some significant positive
changes already taking place in situations of where widespread poverty and social
exclusion exist. In general one of the choices for policy and development personnel is
whether they search out, monitor, learn from, support and promote lessons from these
situations, or whether they take other strategies. While it might be sensible and
common sense to build on positive local changes taking place it would appear that this
is not always done in development circles.  However, as regards practical ways
forward, anyone can decide whether they are going to search out the positive
situations, and build on that. People who influence policy and macro institutional
change can make significant changes tomorrow by asking different questions and
rewarding different behaviour.
What we in the case studies is that key actors were continuously strategic in what they
did. They, almost by definition were not confined to the plans, or if they were they
were continuously looking “outside of the box” to be effective in the particular
parochial and policy context in which they worked.20
Flexibility to Encourage and Support Building on the Positive
“This short history should not be viewed as a “project”, or a pre-determined sequence
of activities. In 1997, the Plant Protection Directorate and FAO reached agreement on
                                                 
20 Interestingly the importance of researchers being continuously strategic in development actions was
one of the main conclusions by Taylor (2005) when discussing bridging research and policy from a UK
perspective.
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a set of broad goals and plans for the initial activities. Subsequent activities were
planned year by year, taking account of the results, which had been achieved, and the
emerging needs and opportunities. In this way the IPM program in Nepal has
“evolved” at a rate which was quicker than anybody expected, and it has taken a
shape which could not have been predicted five years ago.” (Bartlett, 2002, p. 16)
This summary of a review of an IMP farmer field school project in Nepal could be
used to describe many of the outcomes of our case rice participatory plant breeding
project. To some extent they were both “the right projects in the right place”
However, in the case of the rice project, it was significant that the project staff were
able to completely change the project in the first year. However, key to this and the
other case studies was the ability of the actors involved to respond in an institutionally
innovative way to opportunities as they arose. This is a far cry from monitoring to
keep within a tightly formulated planning process, which does not encourage
innovative behaviour to take unforeseen opportunities as they are arise or are looked
for.
Circulation of Ethnographies of Positive Case Studies
As we noted earlier there is a growing literature on positive case studies. What we are
not speaking about here are project/donor sponsored write ups of “successes”, which
sometimes result in guidelines of “best practice”. While on some occasions this
literature might be well done, what I am speaking about here are studies that have
looked in depth at the processes that actually took place in specific location and gave
rise to positive outcomes. The work by Judith Tendler and Anne Marie Goetz are
good examples. They looked at situations where on the surface there were positive
things taking place, then worked back to who did what were and when. They were not
pre-occupied with adoption or impact measurement, or with trying to attribute
outcomes to a particular project, programme or policy. They were interested in
understanding how positive outcomes came about.
This paper has argued that generalisations are difficult, and in the case of socially
relevant and effective institutional innovations, they are generally specific to the
particular contextual setting. In support of this position, the greater promotion of
ethnographic and historical studies would be useful. For example, it would be useful if
those who talk about promoting a green revolution in Africa, as if it was a simple
matter of developing and promoting technology, would read the chapter in Sivaraman
autobiography of his personal experiences as a top administrator in the Indian
government during the time of the green revolution. He describes what was done with
incredible centrally controlled planning, 21 massive subsidisation of agricultural in
high potential areas, and huge support from very rich and powerful international
NGOs.  At a more micro level, Duffs study of the spread of axial flow threshers in the
Philippines and in Thailand shows how the promotion of the same technology in two
different political, social and economic environments had very different impacts on
poverty reduction criteria. There are many more ethnographic type studies of actual
                                                 
21 In addition, from a scientific point of view, the rapid spread of high yielding wheat’s was partly  sue
to chance, as the scientists at the time did not realise at the time how “very widely adoptable” the
varieties introduced from the Mexican wheat programme were under a vary wide range of growing
conditions in India, Bangladesh Pakistan nd Nepal. While at the time government and aid agencies
were promoting package of high levels of inputs, farmers were doing their own adaptive research and
developing locally specific agronomy practices; sometimes for very poor agro climatic conditions.
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processes of positive change that could be part of a basis for reflection, learning and
change.
Broadening Monitoring to include positive deviance analysis
 At the project level, this would mean asking questions like: What important socially
responsible significant things have been taking place in the project, that were
unplanned, but unforeseen opportunity arose and project staff responded to these
events. What actions were taken? Another question that might be asked is: Over the
last year, what have you learnt from other projects in the same region, or in the same
type of work, that contain ideas, institutions, or technology which are more relevant to
your social responsibly goals than some of what you now have in your project. How
have you already capitalised on this information and changed your project?
Initiation of New Studies
Another practical way forward is to initiate new studies to explore positive deviance
situations.  When starting the work on groups and group based organisations in Nepal
we were asked questions like:  How will you find positive case studies, will they be
representative, etc. We found it was far easier to find important positive case studies
than we expected. At the time of the study there was a comparatively free press, and
by review of local newspapers over a year or so, pointed to most major positive case
studies. Another method we used was to ask key informants in major sectors what was
happening in that sector. These interviews were interesting as they often also threw
into relief how different interviewees had very different views of what “positive”
meant. These interviews highlighted the need for criteria for assessing positive
change.  As we were looking for situations where gender relationships and social
inclusion had improved, many of the automatic responses saw success in project
goals, area under crops, groups contacted, etc. However, that information was also
very valuable to us. On occasions, it was clear that although a key informant
interviewee considered themselves as sector wide knowledgeable, their knowledge
was often quite parochial, and “out of date” as regards what was actually happening in
that sector and what currently happening on the ground. This held especially for the
staff of international major donor funded projects. However, all these experiences told
us that, in order to get the information we wanted we had to be innovative and use a
variety of social science methods. There are far more documents that outline these
types of actor/ethnographic methods for use in development situations22
CONCLUSIONS
The positive approach being suggested here is not new. The three case studies suggest
we can learn the following four personal lessons from past effective practitioners.
They are:  1) Be creative within a flexible poverty reduction and socially inclusive
framework, 2) Continuously learn from positive experiences, both from within your
own context and from parallel outside situations, 3) Think strategically, and search
out opportunities, and 4) acknowledged and effectively addressed pressures from
parochial interests as they will always be there.
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